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No.1 in Growth 
Taiwan's growth record ranks first in the 
world, according to Euromoney (October 
1981). This observer learned about the back-
ground of its success as well as remaining 
problems during a recent visit, which in-
cluded discussions with government officials 
and on-site inspection of industrial and ag-
ricultural projects. With three-fourths of  the 
world's population still struggling to modern-
ize their economies and attain decent living 
standards, Taiwan provides a fascinating case 
study for:students of  economic development 
and of its attendant problems. 
Record of growth 
Taiwan has four-fifths as many people as 
California, although its area (14,000 square 
miles) is less than one-tenth California's size. 
Moreover  ..  those 17 million people are con-
centrated around urban centers on narrow 
coastal plains on the northern and western 
sides of  the mountainous island. The climate, 
being subtropical and rainy, supports a 
bountiful agriculture capable of yielding 
three crops of rice a year iQ the south. But the 
land has little else to offer. The soil is badly 
leached, containing few nutrients; the plenti-
ful rainfall rushes down the steep mountain 
slopes into the sea, often bringing havoc to 
farmland and towns alongthe way; and there 
are virtually no mineral deposits besides 
some mined-out veins of  low-grade coal. 
On this unpromising land, some thirty years 
ago, a population of 8 million eked out a 
living mainly by intensive agriculture. Rice 
and sugar constituted nearly 80 percent of 
Taiwan's exports at that time, and these paid 
for its imports of consumer goods and capital 
goods essential for agricultural and industrial 
development. In the late 1940s, the economy 
was also wracked by a runaway inflation 
which nearly brought production to a 
standsti II. 
All that is changed now. First, through a 
drastic monetary reform, the authorities 
brought inflation under control by the early 
1950s. Second, a program of land reform and 
technology improvement spurred ag-
ricultural development, and this provided a 
sound base for industrial development by 
providing expanded supplies of industrial 
raw materials and a growing market for in-
dustrial output. In the 1950s, development 
took place primarily in labor-intensive, low-
technology industries, such as textiles, food-
processing, plastics, paper, and plywood. 
Later, as capital accumulated and technology 
improved, the focus shifted towards more 
capital-intensive and higher-technology in-
dustries, such as electronics, electrical 
appliances, and petrochemicals. 
At the same time, the government's foreign-
trade policy changed from an import-
substitution orientation to one of export 
promotion. More and more, instead of com-
peting with one another in the narrow, 
crowded domestic market, producers strove 
to win an increasing share of a rapidly ex-
panding world economy. Under the unre-
lenting discipline of the world market, pro-
ductivity increased rapidly. Exports rose 
about 20 percent per year, on average, from 
$0.1  billion in 1952 to about US$20 billion in 
1980. Taiwan thus rose to become the 20th 
largest trading nation in the world in 1980 in 
terms of total value of trade (exports plus 
imports), and the eighth largest U.S. trading 
partner-second only to  Japan in Asia. Indus-
trial products-ranging from textiles, elec-
tronic products, shoes to machinery-
accounted for more than 90 percent of its 
exports in 1980, compared to less than 10 
percent in 1952. 
The export-led growth has yielded consider-
able benefits. Total output increased at a 
9-percent annual rate from 1952 to 1980, 
compared to 4 percent for industrial coun-
tries and 5 percent for other developi  ng cou  n-
tries during the same period. With a ten-fold 
output growth and a doubling of population, Opinion~; exprE.·5~ed in  this news!t"tter do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the management 
01  the Federai  Reserve Bank of San  Francisco, 
or of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
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per capita income in 1980 at US$2,280 was 
about five times the 1952 level in real terms. 
This has made possible a doubling of per 
capita protein food-intake, a fivefold increase 
in per capita real expenditure on clothing, a 
doubling of housing space, and a 17  -fold rise 
in per capita consumption of electricity. 
Ownership of a refrigerator, almost a neces-
sity in the subtropical climate, rose from 
61  per thousand households in 1966 to 888 
in 1979. 
However, the fru its are not all sweet. Along 
with prosperity have come problems of 
traffic, air pollution and crowding. Riding a 
taxi on Taipei streets is often a hair-raising 
experience; New York City taxi drivers ap-
pear sedate next to their Taipei counterparts. 
The city has yet to resolve its sewage prob-
lems: streets remain flooded hours after a 
heavy downpour. Air pollution continues to 
present a health hazard despite stringent 
measures for its abatement. The city is over-
crowded, and residents complain about the 
lack of parks and playgrounds. In addition, 
. real-estate speculation has driven housing 
prices out of reach for most first-time home 
buyers. 
Stagflation, Taiwan style 
Since 1979, Taiwan has also caught the dis-
ease common to many national econo-
mies-namely, high inflation coupled with 
low economic growth. For Taiwan, that 
means real output growth of  roughly five per-
cent a year-much higher than that of the 
major industrial countries, but only about 
half the growth that Taiwan had become ac-
customed to in recent decades. The more 
volatile industrial-production index rose 8 
percent in 1980, compared to the 15-percent 
annual average increase of  the preceding 
decade-and it actually fell by4 percentdur-
ing the first half of this year. 
Yet,  inflation, rather than growth, appears to 
be Taiwan's major problem, with consumer 
prices rising 22 percent in 1980 and at an 
even sharper pace this year. Taiwan's con-
sumers were even less prepared for this than 
they were for the slowdown in growth. Con-
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.  sumer prices rose at a 3-percent average an-
nual rate between 1952 and 1972, compared 
to 3112 percent for the industrial countries and 
13 percent for other developing countries. 
Thefirstoil-priceshockhitTaiwan hard,lead-
ing to a 47-percent general price increase in 
1974 to adjust for the shock. But the inflation 
rate then slowed to 5 percent a year in 1975-
78, compared to 9 percent in the industrial 
countries and 26 percent for other develop-
ing countries. The subsequent upsurge in in-
flation thus stands in sharp contrast to the 
remarkable success with which the au-
thorities brought inflation under control in the 
mid-1970s. 
Money and credit growth 
Taiwan's inflation experience has reflected 
the past decade's monetary-growth· record. 
The 1974 inflation was preceded by an ex-
plosive 43-percent annual monetary growth 
in 1972-73, compared to the 17-percent 
growth rate of  the preceding five years. 
Likewise, the "1979-81  inflation was pre-
ceded by a 32-percent annual monetary 
growth in 1977-78, compared to an 18-
percent growth rate of  the preceding three 
years. 
The sharp swings in the growth of net foreign 
assets were the dominant factor behind the 
instability in Taiwan's monetary growth dur-
ing the past two decades (see chart). In partic-
ular, the peaks of  monetary growth in 1963-
64,1967,1972-73, and 1977-78 closely 
coincided with those in the growth rate of  the 
banking system's net foreign assets. 
Moreover, the years of unusually low money 
growth-1962, 1965, 1968, 1974, and 
1979-were also years of negative or zero 
growth in net foreign assets. 
This does not mean that domestic credit ex-
tension played no role in affecting Taiwan's 
money growth. In fact, since 1973, it did, 
following the remarkably stable (around 20 
percent a year) annual growth rate of most of 
the pre-1973 period. A sharp rise in domestic 
credit in 1973 coincided with rapid growth in 
net foreign assets, thus adding to the extra-
ordinarily high money growth that year. Con-Change(%) 
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tinued high domestic-credit growth in thefol-
lowing two years cushioned the impact of  the 
sharp decline in net foreign assets on the 
money-growth rate. Then, in 1977-78, high 
domestic-credit growth again coincided with 
high growth of net foreign assets to account 
for another upsurge in monetary growth. In 
short, since 1973, unstable domestic-credit 
growth has exacerbated monetary-growth in-
stability in some years and moderated it in 
other years. 
The close parallelism between domestic 
money growth and growth of net fqreign as-
sets typifies open econom  ies that attempt to 
peg their currencies to gold or  to trading part-
ners' currencies. Taiwan is a good example of 
such an economy, with 55 percent of its out-
put exported and the exchange rate nomi-
nally floating and in fact pegged to the U.S. 
dollar. Money growth in these economies is 
largely determined by balance-of-payments 
considerations. When international demand 
strengthens for the country's goods, s~rvices 
and financial assets, its banking system tends 
to accumulate foreign assets and the money 
supply expands; when international demand 
slackens, foreign assets fall and the money 
supply contracts. Given the close relation-
ship between domestic money supply and 
aggregate demand, the policy implies ac-
quiescence to instability in the national 
"conomy -as  is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the gold-standard mechanism 
(Weekly Letter, November 20, 1981). 
Past and present choices 
Under such circumstances, a nation has a 
choice of two ways to achieve economic 
stabilization. One is to let the exchange rate 
float, and the other is to adopt an active mon-
etary policy, deliberately offsetting the fluctu-
ations in the banking system's net holdings of 
foreign assets. Taiwan appreciated its cur-
rency in February 1973 and again in July 
1978, each time by a little over five percent. 
Recently, in August 1981, it depreciated by 
slightly less than five percent, in an attemptto 
stimulate export growth. But by and large, the 
authorities have displayed a reluctance to ad-
just the exchange rate frequently in response 
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to fluctuations in the nation's balance of 
payments. 
The authorities have faced two major obsta-
cles in conducting a monetary policy de-
signed to offset changes in net foreign assets. 
One obstacle, until recently, was the lack of 
adequate policy instruments-such as open-
market operations, flexibility in the use of 
reserve requirements and discount policy-
for adjusting the monetary base. In this con-
nection, the recent rapid growth of money 
markets, including a Treasury-bill market, 
should provide more scope in the future for 
monetary control. The second obstacle, how-
ever, is essentially political, arising from 
political pressures for supplying liquidity for 
fueling business expansions. In this connec-
tion, those who are familiar with the U.S. 
monetary scene can be sympathetic with 
Taiwan's authorities, s'i'ncethe central bank in 
Taiwan apparently does not en joy the same 
degree of independence as does the Federal 
Reserve. 
Nevertheless, Taiwan's monetary authorities 
must make a choice. An undervalued na-
tional currency can no doubt  stimulate export 
growth, which in turn can lead to output 
growth, technology enhancement and indus-
trial diversification. However, the resultant 
accumulation offoreign assets in the banking 
system can threaten monetary stability. Cur-
rency appreciation in an economy as highly 
dependent  on exports as Taiwan's is always a 
bitter medicine  to take. One alternative in the 
short run would be to remove the import 
barriers that Taiwan still uses to protect "vi-
tal" domestic industries. Another would be to 
perm  it free international capital flows, so that 
domestic interest rates cou Id ad just to 
money-market  conditions. Yet a third alterna-
tive, which is needed in any case, is to 
strengthen the instruments of monetary pol-
icy, so that the authorities cou Id obtain better 
control over the monetary base-at least in 
the short run. Eventually, however, there is no 
alternative to greater exchange-rate flexibility 
if  the authorities hope to maintain domestic 
economic stability. 
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Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.S. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 






































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures  11/25/81  11/18/81 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-)  97  33 
Borrowings  2  16 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed( - )  95  17 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,372  6.5 
10,684  8.7 
3,479  9.5 
5,509  11.0 
610  2.5 
744  62.3 
1,234  - 18.3 
74  0.5 
4,368  - 9.5 
4,362  13.5 
426  1.5 
18,138  26.1 
18,621  30.9 






* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
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